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INTRODUCTION
Fitting with the theme of this volume, we are interested in explaining firms’ environmental
performance, and factors affecting firms’ abilities to improve that performance. We investigate
the role of technology as a factor in influencing firms’ environmental strategies. We also
consider whether a firm’s primary technology type is a moderating factor between its global
environmental strategy and its financial performance.
Much of the prior literature on corporate environmental performance has considered the link
between environmental performance and profit (see Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003 for one
of many reviews of this topic). If the broad message from the numerous studies of environmental
and financial performance is that it can pay to be green (or perhaps, that it does not have to cost
to be green), the bigger question that remains may be “when does it pay to be green?” Embedded
in that question, we believe, is the question of which organizations will have a greater ability to
improve their environmental performance, and what role does a firm’s industry and core
technology play in its ability to improve its environmental performance (Schaltegger &
Synnestvedt, 2002).
We argue that understanding environmental performance is, by itself, important for
organizational scholars. That is, we need to understand the factors that affect environmental
performance regardless of the link between financial performance and environmental factors.
Margolis and Walsh (2003) argue forcefully for this perspective, as they suggest that the
emphasis on understanding how social responsibility affects profit “leaves unexplored questions
about what it is firms are actually doing in response to social misery and what effects corporate
actions have, not only on the bottom line but also on society (p. 278).”
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Below, we describe the role of technological change and technology type in affecting
environmental performance. We argue that one of the key constraints on a firm’s ability to
improve its environmental performance is the technology in which it is embedded. We develop
hypotheses regarding the influence of technology type on a firm’s global environmental strategy,
and test these hypotheses using a panel of MNEs. We find that technology type does influence a
firm’s global environmental strategy, and the financial return associated with using a global
environmental standard.
TECHNOLOGY TYPE
In this chapter we follow the model proposed by Tushman and Rosenkopf (1992) and
conceptualize technological complexity as a typology of products ranging from simple to
complex. This typology includes four product types as shown in Table 5.1: (1) non-assembled
products; (2) simple assembled products; (3) closed systems; and (4) open systems.
(Insert Table 5.1 here)
Non-assembled products consist of raw materials that are transformed through a series of
sequentially linked steps or manufacturing subprocesses (such as chemical, thermal, or
machining). Examples of non-assembled products include aluminum, steel, glass, and petroleum.
Because of their simplistic nature, the performance of such products are evaluated on relatively
simple unidimensional scales of efficiency and value (such as price/ unit or price/performance).
While technological progress can be made through process or product improvements, such
decisions are largely made at the managerial level with minimal sociopolitical influence.
Simple assembled products are made up of distinct subsystems that fit together through a set
of interlinked steps that are sequentially ordered. Examples include stoves, guns, skis, and books.
Like non-assembled products, the performance criteria for simple assembled products are clear
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and easily measured (such as price/unit or price/performance). Technological progress occurs
through process innovation or product substitution as technical considerations dominate
organizational considerations in the quest for superior alternative processes or inputs.
Composed of various subsystems, assembled systems are much more complex than nonassembled or simple assembled products. Assembled systems can be conceptualized into two
distinct classes: closed and open systems. Closed systems are bounded and often produced by a
single organization whereas open systems are unbounded and produced by networks of
organizations. Examples of closed systems include watches, automobiles, and airplanes. Because
there are multiple subsystems, performance evaluation is much more complex as the overall
system performance depends on the subsystem performance and interface technologies. Unlike
non-assembled or simple assembled products, the subsystems of closed systems are not
necessarily of equal importance – some subsystems are more central, others play a more
peripheral role. For example, the engine is a core subsystem that plays a central role in the
overall performance and technological progress of the automobile, whereas the wheels, brakes,
and steering are peripheral subsystems that are highly dependent on the engine’s characteristics.
Because the closed system is composed of several subsystems, technical progress occurs at the
subsystem level with each subsystem having its own unidimensional path of progress largely
driven by process and/or product innovation at the non-assembled or simple product level. Like
simple assembled products, a dominant design emerges through technical competition of
alternative processes and subsystems.
Open systems are composed of a set of closed systems linked together through interface
technologies. Examples of open systems include railroads, television, the Internet, and other
telecommunication networks. While each closed subsystem evolves independently, the system as
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a whole is composed of a network of highly interdependent systems that is inherently complex
and subject to a variety of sociopolitical forces. Technical progress generally occurs at the
component and subsystem level until a dominant design can be achieved. Yet because of the high
interdependency between the components and subsystems, technical progress of the overall
system can be slowed as various organizations and other social and/or political institutions
compete for the optimal design. In summary, the more complex the technological type, the
greater the social and technical uncertainty and the influence of social and political processes on
the nature and path of technical progress. In the following section, we develop hypotheses that
address the role of technology type on environmental performance.
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PERFORMANCE
Managing a firm’s environmental performance is complicated by the plethora of regulatory
regimes to which a firm has to attend. This process is difficult for firms that have operations
distributed through a single country, but becomes even more complex for MNEs. Some
corporations, with operations spread across very different jurisdictions, face not simply different
regulations, but significantly differing levels of environmental requirements, with some
jurisdictions requiring relatively stringent environmental performance, and other, so-called
pollution havens allowing firms a wide latitude in their environmental impacts.
Meyer (2004) reviews the academic literature that addresses MNEs’ effects on the
environment. He discusses the arguments that MNEs have two potential environmental effects in
their host-countries. First, firms may bring state-of-the-art environmental technology to
jurisdictions that previously did not enjoy such technologies. Second, firms may take advantage
of lax regulations and behave in ways that are not allowed in more stringent jurisdictions. Such
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behavior might include emitting more pollution or producing products that have been banned due
to their environmental impact.
Anecdotal evidence of both chasing pollution havens and employing state-of-the-art
technologies exists. More interesting, for the purposes of this chapter, is understanding when one
strategy is more likely than the other, and how using one or the other strategy affects firm
performance. Broadly speaking, firms have two choices. First, they can allow subsidiaries to
meet local environmental standards, whether those standards are strict or lax. Second, the
corporation can mandate that all subsidiaries follow the same standard, even if that standard
exceeds what is required in the local jurisdiction.
Dowell, Hart, and Yeung (2000) review the arguments for and against employing a global
environmental standard. The benefits, they suggest, fall into three categories. First, employing a
single global standard facilitates knowledge sharing among the firm’s subsidiaries. Second, firms
can enjoy reputational benefits from adhering to strict standards even when the standards are not
mandated. Third, if countries’ standards tend to become stricter as they develop, going beyond
currently-mandated requirements can preempt the need to improve performance to meet
improving standards later.
The costs of employing a global standard arise because many solutions to environmental
issues impose added production costs to companies (Newton & Harte, 1997; Walley &
Whitehead, 1994). The degree to which stringency imposes added costs may depend upon how
the stringency is achieved, however, as pollution prevention can involve efficiencies as firms
find ways to avoid pollution altogether, rather than to involve costly treatment (Hart, 1995).
Even so, there is evidence that not all forms of pollution prevention are profitable (King &
Lenox, 2002), and that firms may need to develop complementary assets in order to profit from
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pollution prevention (Christmann, 2000). Thus, on average, going beyond environmental
requirements may force firms to incur costs they would not otherwise experience.
Rather than argue whether, overall, global standards have net benefits for firms, it is more
instructive to consider conditions that might affect the relative benefits of such standards. That is,
we wish to outline contingencies in the global standard–profit relationship. While a number of
internal and external contingencies are possible, we focus on the influence of technology type on
both the probability that a firm will attempt to implement a global standard, and the profitability
of doing so.
HYPOTHESES
We follow Dowell et al. (2000) and consider an MNE to have two broad choices in its global
environmental practices. First, it can alter its environmental practices in its various international
operations, so that in stringent jurisdictions it practices greater environmental stewardship than it
practices in less stringent jurisdictions. Second, the firm can attempt to enact a single, global
environmental standard in all jurisdictions in which it operates. While there are potential benefits
to either of these strategies, Dowell et al. (2000) find that the market values of those firms that
we a global environmental standard are significantly higher than the values of those firms using
the host country standards.
In considering their results, we ask what we believe to be a fundamental question: why, if
global environmental standards are associated with higher value, do all firms not pursue such
standards? There are, of course, a number of internal and external factors that could affect a
firm’s ability to enact and derive value from a global environmental standard. Christmann
(2000), for example, demonstrates that firms are better able to profit from environmental best
practices if they also possess complementary assets such as capability for process innovation.
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While internal factors such as complementary assets are likely to be important for firms deriving
value from global standards, we focus here on the role of a firm’s technology type on its ability
to (a) enact a global standard and (b) realize value from such a standard.
Global firms face a confusing array of regulations and standard practices in the varying
jurisdictions in which they operate (Hebb & Wójcik, 2005; Stiglitz, 2002). While it may be
tempting to consider global standards to be a ready solution to these differences, we argue that,
in fact, global standards are difficult to enact, particularly in the presence of legacy investments
(Lundan, 2003). The legacy investments place constraints on a firm’s attempts to produce in the
same way in all jurisdictions, which means that a firm that uses proactive pollution prevention
technologies in more modern plants may be forced to use pollution control techniques in older
facilities.
Taking the difficulty of enacting a global standard as given, the question remains whether
and how technology type might affect a firm’s ability to enact a standard. At first glance, it might
seem that systems technologies are naturally more conducive to enacting global environmental
standards, we argue that, in fact, they are the most difficult technologies in which to do so. As
described above, systems technologies are particularly prone to political influence, and thus
standards and practices can differ greatly between jurisdictions. The increased political influence
on these standards means that deviance from a practice in a given jurisdiction is particularly
circumscribed.
The case of television illustrates the difficulty of enacting a global standard in an open
systems technology. In the mid-1980s the US began to consider adopting a standard for high
definition television, and though Japan had already created high definition broadcast capabilities,
political processes (fueled by anti-Japanese sentiment due to the loss of US competitiveness in
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electronics) led to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) creating a standards
competition, which eventually settled on a series of standards, none of which were compatible
with the Japanese system (Brinkley, 1997). The standards in television broadcasting remain
different across jurisdictions today.
The well-known Intel strategy of “copy exactly,” in which equipment and processes are
duplicated precisely across its global factories, might seem to contradict our contention that open
system technologies exacerbate the difficulty of creating global standards. Certainly,
microprocessors are components of an open system technology in computing. We offer two
observations of the situation for Intel that, we believe, reduce its power as a counter-example.
First, it is notable that though Intel completed adoption of its “copy exactly” strategy in 1996, it
remains an iconic, perhaps unique, example of such a strategy, which to us underscores the
difficulty of enacting this strategy. Second, Intel reports that implementing the strategy, even in
its high capital-turnover industry, took over a decade, which suggests that for firms lacking
Intel’s resources and capital replacement cycle (meaning, of course, nearly all other firms in the
world), it would take even longer and be even more difficult to create payback.
Our contention, then, is that firms that operate in less complex technological spaces will have
an easier time enacting global environmental standards. We expect, therefore, that firms in nonassembled and simple assembled technology industries will be more likely to enact global
environmental standards, and that the relationship between global standards and market value is
stronger for such firms:
Hypothesis 1a: The probability that a firm will use a global environmental standard is lower if
the firm primarily uses an open or closed system technology than if it uses a non-assembled or
simple assembled technology.

8

Hypothesis 1b: The market value of firms using global environmental standards is lower for
those firms that primarily use open or closed system technologies compared to those that use
non-assembled or simple assembled technologies.
DATA AND METHODS
For hypotheses 1a and 1b, we assess a firm’s global environmental standards using the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) survey data of S&P 500 firms. These data and the global
standard measure specifically, were used in Dowell, Hart and Yeung’s (2000) study of the
relationship between environmental standards and market value. The data, gathered by IRRC
surveys, are available from 1994–97, so they cover a limited time period, but one in which there
was an ongoing managerial debate over the profitability of going beyond compliance in
environmental efforts, thus making this an important period for analysis.
Each firm in the IRRC data set indicates whether it uses the host country standard in each
country in which it operates, attempts to use US standards around the world, or has an internal
global environmental standard that it attempts to apply throughout its operations. Dowell et al.
(2000) find that firms that use global environmental standards had significantly higher market
values, as measured by Tobin’s Q, than firms that used either the US standards or the host
country standards. From the IRRC survey, we create an indicator variable that takes on the value
of 1 if the firm uses an internal global environmental standard, and 0 otherwise.
Our second key variable is the firm’s technology type. To construct this variable, we begin
by assigning each four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code that is represented in
our sample to one of the Tushman and Rosenkopf (1992) classifications. We performed this
classification prior to examining the IRRC sample, so that the technology classifications would
not be biased by knowing which firms in our sample were in which SIC. The IRRC data include
the firm’s main SIC, and we assign each firm to a technology category based upon that SIC
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designation. Many of these companies are diversified, but the data do not allow us to divide their
operations among multiple SICs, so we use the SIC category that the firm considers its main
industry classification. The equations that we employ for hypotheses 1a and 1b are:
(1) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(2) 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

In equation (1), Global Standard is the indicator variable described above. The TechType is a
series of indicator variables, each taking on a “1” if the firm’s industry is classified as a given
type, and X is a vector of control variables. Hypothesis 1a is assessed by the coefficients on the
indicator variables in TechType. In equation (2), Tobin is the firm’s Tobin’s Q value in year t. 1
Global Standard and TechType are as described above. Hypothesis 1b is assessed by the
coefficient β3, which is the coefficient for the interaction of Global Standard and TechType.
Control variables
For equations (1) and (2), we follow Dowell et al. (2000) in our choice of control variables. For
equation (1), we include a firm’s size, measured by its assets and the degree to which its
operations are multinational (percent of foreign assets). Larger, more international firms may
have to expend greater efforts to manage a global environmental standard, but the ensuing
benefits may also be greater for such firms. For equation (2), we include size (assets), research
and development intensity, advertising intensity, and degree of leverage, as these variables have
been shown to affect the firm’s Tobin’s Q (Dowell et al., 2000; Morck & Yeung, 1991). We also
include an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm operates a production facility in
a low-income country, as prior work suggests that low-income countries have lower
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Tobin’s Q is a measure of the market value per dollar of replacement cost of tangible assets. We use the market
value of a firm’s common stock at year end and the replacement costs are calculated using values from Compustat.
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environmental standards (Grossman & Krueger, 1995), and the benefits of using global
environmental standards might differ for firms that operate in such jurisdictions.
Methods
For hypothesis 1a, we use a logistic regression with random effects at the facility level. The
dependent variable, as described above, is 1 if the firm uses a global environmental standard in a
given year, and 0 if it uses a host country standard or uses the US standard. For hypothesis 1b,
we again use regression with random effects at the facility level, with the firm’s Tobin’s Q as the
dependent variable.
(Insert Table 5.2 here)
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 5.2 contains the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the variables. The
correlation results suggest that there are significant differences between firms, depending upon
the technology type in which they operate. For example, firms in systems technologies (both
open and closed) tend to be larger, and open system technology firms tend to spend more on
research and development and less on advertising than other firms, but have a lower percentage
of assets in foreign countries.
(Insert Table 5.3 here)
We now turn to the questions posed in hypotheses 1a and 1b. Does technology type affect the
likelihood of a firm using a single, global environmental standard? Does it affect the return from
doing so? We begin by exploring the data. Table 5.3 shows the frequency of global
environmental standards by technology type. The results show support for the argument that
technology type affects the likelihood of using a global environmental standard, though the
pattern may be a little more complex than hypothesis 1 suggests. It appears that companies that
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primarily operate in industries characterized by non-assembled technologies are most likely to
use global standards, as we predicted. Likewise, those companies that are in industries classified
as open systems technologies have the lowest likelihood of using global standards. The t-test of
the difference in the proportion of non-assembled and open systems firms using global standards
is significant (t-value = 5.41, p = 0.000). Those firms that are in industries classified as closed
system technologies, however, are equally likely to use global standards as the firms in nonassembled technology industries are, while those using assembled systems have a moderate
probability of using global standards.
Overall, the results of Table 5.3 suggest that technology type may play an important role in
affecting a firm’s likelihood of using a single, global environmental standard. The analysis in
Table 5.3, however, does not allow us to control for other factors that might affect the probability
of employing a global standard. For example, if it is more complex to implement a global
standard when the firm has a higher proportion of its assets outside the US, and more of the open
systems firms have a higher proportion of international operations, the results in Table 5.3 could
reflect this, rather than being driven by technology type. To attempt to control for possibilities
such as this, we turn to regression analysis.
(Insert Table 5.4 here)
Table 5.4 contains the results of random-effects logistic regression analysis where the
dependent variable takes on a 1 for firms that use a global environmental standard. Model 1
contains the control variables. The results indicate that larger firms and those with a greater
proportion of international operations are more likely to use a global standard.
Model 2 adds the indicator variables for technology type. The omitted category is nonassembled technology, so the coefficients on the technology type variables represent the increase
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or decrease in probability that a firm in an industry characterized by a given technology uses a
global standard, relative to a firm in a non-assembled technology industry. The results indicate
that firms in open systems technology industries are significantly less likely to use global
standards than are those firms in non-assembled industries. In fact, testing the equality of
coefficients shows that the firms in open systems technologies are significantly less likely to use
global standards than firms in closed systems or simple assembled technologies as well.
(Insert Table 5.5 here)
The results thus far provide strong evidence that a firm’s core technology type does affect its
likelihood of using a global environmental standard. We now turn our attention to whether the
return to employing a global standard differs depending upon the technology type, as predicted
in hypothesis 2. In Table 5.5, we present the results of random-effects regression of a firm’s
Tobin’s Q on the control and independent variables described above. Model 1 contains the
control variables. This model replicates the findings of Dowell et al. (2000), and demonstrates
that firms with more intangible assets, as represented by research and development and
advertising intensity, have higher Tobin’s Q ratios. The key finding from Dowell et al. (2000) is
also demonstrated, as firms that use internal global environmental standards have significantly
higher Tobin’s Q ratios.
In Model 2 we add the indicator variables for technology type (non-assembled technology is
again the omitted category). We also add the interaction between technology type and global
environmental standards. Hypothesis 2 suggests that the coefficient on Global Standard X Open
System should be negative and significant, reflecting the difficulty of enacting a global
environmental standard in an open system technological environment. The results do not support
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hypothesis 2, as the coefficient on the interaction between global standards and open systems is
positive but insignificant.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
By their very size and pervasiveness, MNEs have a massive impact on not only the global
economy, but also on the natural environment. Understanding the factors that affect these
corporations’ impact on the environment, therefore, is an important research question. In this
paper, we have taken a small step forward in advancing our understanding of these factors, by
exploring the relationship between technology type and global environmental strategy.
We find that technology type, as measured by the Tushman & Rosenkopf (1992) typology, is
related to the likelihood that a firm undertakes an internal global environmental standard. Those
firms that operate in industries characterized by open systems technologies are significantly less
likely to use an internal global standard, compared to firms that are in non-assembled technology
sectors. For firms in the open systems sectors, coordinating the practices across multiple
jurisdictions is a complex undertaking, as an open systems technology is characterized by the
presence of multiple, interacting subsystems. In such an environment, a firm cannot make a
decision to modify its practices independent of the other parties involved in the open system,
which makes global coordination difficult for a firm. This difficulty is amplified by the MNC’s
operations that may span vastly different political and technical environments.
We find no evidence that the return on employing a global standard differs depending upon
the technology type. Though this contradicts our prediction that open systems technology firms
would have a lower return on employing a global standard, it suggests that the managers are
acting rationally. That is, firms are not employing global standards in situations in which such
standards reduce their financial returns. Within the sectors characterized by open systems
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technologies, therefore, it is likely that there are some firms for which it is easier to manage
globally coordinated processes, and these firms are the ones that are doing so. With our data, we
are not able to determine what might affect the firms’ abilities to manage global standards, but
one candidate is experience with global operations, as experience has been shown to increase
firms’ abilities to deal with complexity (Dowell & Killaly, 2009).
Taking our key findings together, we believe that our results provide evidence that firms’
abilities to proactively manage their interactions with the physical environment are positively
related to their overall quality of management. This relationship has been discussed at least since
Cairncross (1991), who argued that “Companies that take the environment seriously change not
only their processes and products but also the way they run themselves (p. 279).” Dowell et al.’s
(2000) results are consistent with this argument as they suggest that companies that use a global
standard rather than ratcheting down to a host country standard were better-run companies. Our
results further this ‘green management is good management’ hypothesis, as we find that some
companies are better able to overcome technical restrictions and profit by doing so.
Overall, our results have several implications. First, they point to the importance of
understanding the external context in targeting firms and industries for environmental
improvement. Christmann (2000) and others have shown the importance of understanding
context in assessing environmental performance. Our findings suggest that the external context,
which we represent here by the technology in a firm’s core industry, is also important.
Our results also speak to research that seeks to understand the leap from pollution prevention
to sustainability. If we take as given that the leap to sustainability is even more complicated than
the greening attempts we have observed, then we need to have a strong understanding of the
barriers to companies becoming more sustainable. This link is important not only for academics
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studying environmental performance, but also for managers seeking to understand the task of
organizational change involved in enacting better environmental performance.
Finally, the results have implications for public policy. As policy experts look to find the
right combination of carrots and sticks to enable firms to move to more sustainable positions, it
is important to understand how to fit the policy to the technology. The results of our global
sample indicate that firms in complex technologies, for example, may react differently to
legislation than firms that are in less complex situations.
This research should be seen as exploratory. Many other issues to consider and control
variables could be important, but could not be incorporated in this initial attempt to understand
the relationships. We believe that this is the first attempt to understand how technology type
affects environmental performance, and indeed is one of the few attempts to date to really try to
assess the role of technology type in organizational change in any setting. Our results are likely
to create more questions than answers in our quest to understand how to move to a more
sustainable world.
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Table 5.1

Technology types
Process
Technology Examples
type
Aluminum,
Chemical,
Nonthermal,
assembled steel, glass,
gears,
machining –
paper,
sequentially
fibers,
inter-linked
petroleum,
steps
springs

Performance
Criteria

Influences on
Change

Unidimensional
based upon price/
performance

Adoption
as price/
performance
of new process
or product
exceeds
existing.

Simple
assembled

Stoves,
hoses,
cans, skis,
containers,
guns

Assembly

Unidimensional
based upon price/
performance

Adoption
as price/
performance
of new process
or product
exceeds
existing.

Closed
system

Watch,
bicycle, car,
airplane

Assembly at
subsystem
and system
level

Multidimensional
depending
upon subsystem
performance and
linkages

Change at
subsystem
or system
level; political
processes
important.

Open
system

Computer,
power
generation,
television

Assembly at
subsystem
and system
level

Multidimensional
depending
upon subsystem
performance,
linkages and
technological
interdependencies

Inherently
political –
competition
between
systems and
subsystems
with multiple
performance
criteria
available
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Table 5.2
Variable
(1) Tobin's q
(2) Size (ln assets)
(3) R&D intensity
(4) Advertising
intensity
(5) Leverage
(6) Percentage of
foreign assets
(7) Global
environmental
standard
(8) Nonassembled
technology
(9) Simple
assembled
technology
(10) Closed
systems
technology
(11) Open systems
technology

Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients
Mean
(1)
(2)
(3)
(Std Dev)
2.98
(2.82)
8.91
(1.21)
0.04
(0.04)
0.02
(.04)
0.18
(0.11)
0.28
(0.17)
0.37
(0.48)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

1.000
-0.023

1.000

0.240

-0.224

1.000

0.375

-0.050

0.018

1.000

-0.278

0.159

-0.486

-0.156

1.000

0.206

-0.068

0.386

0.134

-0.323

1.000

0.325

0.246

0.108

0.092

-0.077

0.154

1.000

0.39
(0.48)
0.21
(0.41)

0.103

0.034

-0.089

0.048

-0.082

0.158

0.181

1.000

0.128

-0.208

-0.037

0.197

0.010

0.054

-0.042

-0.415

1.000

0.14
(0.35)
0.18
(0.38)

-0.113

0.133

0.030

-0.053

0.066

-0.030

-0.015

-0.326

-0.209

1.000

-0.092

0.159

0.142

-0.140

0.008

0.188

-0.146

-0.376

-0.242

0.190
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Table 5.3
Technology
Type
Nonassembled
Assembled
Closed system
Open system
Total

Frequency of global environmental standards by technology type
Internal global standard
Other
Total

151
(48.4%)
111
(33.5%)
44
(39.3%)
32
(22.4%)
283
(38.6%)

Table 5.4
Variable
Constant
Size (ln assets)
R&D intensity
Advertising intensity
Leverage
Percentage of foreign
operations

161
(51.6%)
56
(66.5%)
68
(60.7%)
111
(77.6%)
451
(61.4%)

Effect of technology type on probability of using
a global environmental standard
Model 1
Model 2
-11.580
-11.000
(2.247)
(2.128)
1.015 ***
1.059 ***
(0.227)
(0.218)
4.177
9.860 *
(5.841)
(5.863)
1.049
-0.091
(5.435)
(5.204)
-1.526
-1.259
(1.979)
(1.933)
0.050 ***
(0.016)

Assembled technology
Closed system technology
Open system technology

0.035 **
(0.016)
-0.613
(0.615)
-0.873
(0.687)
-2.549 ***
(0.736)

Notes: All models have 734 observations. ***, **, *: significant at 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10 respectively.
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312
167
112
143
734

Table 5.5
Variable
Constant
Size (ln assets)
R&D intensity
Advertising intensity
Leverage

Effect of technology type on relation between
global environmental standard and Tobin's Q
Model 1
Model 2
-0.458
-0.848
(1.224)
(1.244)
0.256 *
0.326 **
(0.133)
(0.136)
9.159 ***
10.470
(3.439)
(3.513)
19.610 ***
18.640
(3.450)
(3.455)
-2.401 **
-2.528 **
(1.110)
(1.107)

Percentage of foreign
operations

0.018 **
(0.009)

0.013
(0.009)
0.473
(0.459)
-0.623
(0.537)
-0.569
(0.500)

0.977 ***
(0.158)

0.985 ***
(0.222)
0.127
(0.400)

Assembled technology
Closed system technology
Open system technology
Global environmental
standard
Global standard X assembled
Global standard X closed
system

-0.696
(0.453)

Global standard X open
system

0.407
(0.477)

Notes: All models have 734 observations. ***, **, *: significant at 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10 respectively.
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